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LENDING COSTS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AN LDC SETTING: 
IS CHEAP CREDIT REALLY CHEAP? 
Abstract 
The contrast in lending costs for a public and a private sector bank 
servicing agriculture in an LDC setting illustrates that cheap lines of crecit 
from external donors are not cheap. Results underscore the need to reevaluate 
policies to make a positive contribution to institutional viability or accept 
permanent subsidization. 
LENDING COSTS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AN LDC SETTING: 
IS CHEAP CREDIT REALLY CHEAP? 
1. Introduction 
The financial system of Honduras has been working under different 
regulatory schemes during the last decade. Recent years have been charac-
terized by a decreasing trend in the overall level of liquidity in the system, 
du~ mainly to the growing share of the public sector in total domestic credit, 
a phenomenon that has imposed further constraints on the operation of the 
financial sector. In this environment, the operational efficiency of finan-
cial institutions becomes of crucial importance conditioning their viability 
and overall performance. Lending costs in particular, can be seriously 
affected by different polirieq almerl at the financial sector, especially those 
policies that regulate the interest rate structure and loan targeting criteria 
that affect the composition of the portfolio of th~ lending institutions. 
These two features have been important components of the recent Honduran 
policy environment. 
Resource costs involved in loan operations, usually referred to as 
administrative (non-financial) costs of loans, can be of considerable magni-
tude in lending institutions dealing with agriculture, if small farmers are an 
important component of their clientel~. These costs have been estimated to be 
in the range of 3 to 10 percentage points (Saito and Villanueva, World Bank) 
depending on the term structure of the loan portfolio and the scale of opera-
tiona of the farmers receiving loans. Nyanin has estimated the average loan 
administration costs of the Jamaican Development Bank at 11.5% with a range 
between 8% and 14% over a seven year period. 
In this study we document and analyze the level and structure of l~nding 
costs in two important financial institutions in Honduras, the National 
2 
Agricultural Development Bank (DB) and the largest private commercial bank in 
the country (PB). The two banks together accounted for 26.3% of the portfolio 
of new loans of the banking system in 1981, the year of the study, and granted 
44.5% of the value of new loans to agriculture that same year. Loans to agri-
culture represented almost 70% of the portfolio of the DB. This bank 
accounted for 33% of the banking system's lending to the agricultural sector. 
The share of agricultural loans in the PB's portfolio of new loans was 14%, 
this bank provided 11.4% of the total value of new loans to agriculture in the 
year of the study. 
Comparative analysis of the cost structures of these two banks yields 
important implications for financial policies and provides useful insights 
into the peculiar characteristics of the operations of public development 
banks. In the case of the private commercial bank, it was possible to esti-
mate the incidence of loan size, source of funds, and end-use on the magnitude 
of lending costs. These results, together with those obtained for the deve-
lopment bank, raise serious questions concerning the rules and regulations 
that typically accompany special agricultural credit programs and projects, 
sponsored by the government and/or international donor agencies. In Section 2 
we summarize the methodology utilized in the study. We present and analyze 
the results and their implications in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes our 
conclusions. 
2. Methodology 
Our study focused on the non-financial (administrative) costs of both 
banks. ~sk-related costs such as provision for bad debt were excluded from 
the analysis given the different criteria applied by the accounting units of 
the two institutions. A representative sample of branches was selected in 
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both cases, accounting for 55% of the loan portfolio and for 49% of total non-
financial costs in the case of the DB. These percentages were 86% and 88% 
respectively in the PB case. 
The income-expenditure statements of the branches were the basis for our 
cost estimates. The identification of th~ expenses related directly to credit 
operations and the functional breakdown of these costs were based on branch-
level surveys undertaken separately in both institutions. These surveys con-
sisted of a set of questionnaires administered by the authors in interviews 
with branch managers, credit officials, agronomists, credit analists, 
accounting personnel and clerical employees. 
3. Results, Analysis and Implications 
The main results of the study are summarized in Table 1. Rows 1 and 2 of 
this table characterize the distribution of total operational (i.e. non-
financial) costs in each bank between lending costs associated with credit 
activity (row 1) and operational costs associated with deposit mobilization 
and other banking services (row 2). Rows 3 through 6 disaggregate and 
classify the lending or credit-related costs according to the level of the 
bank's structure at which they are generated (rows 3 and 4) and according to 
the conventional classification between direct and indirect costs (row 5), and 
stressing the different incidence of personnel costs in the two banks (row 6). 
The estimated levels of lending costs, both per loan an per lempira lentll are 
indicated in rows 7 and R of Table 1. Finally, the functional breakdown of 
lending costs is presented in rows 9 through 12 of the same table. 
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 1 show a sharp contrast between the two banks in 
terms of the incidence of lending costs in total costs, as compared to the 
lf 2 lempiras • 1 u.s. dollar 
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Table 1. Level and Structure of Lending Costs, 
Commercial Bank ~ Development Bank. 
Criterion 
1. Share of lending costs in 
overall coste 
2. Share of deposit mobilization and 
other banking services in overall 
coats 
3. Share of branch-level costs in 
total lending costs 
4. Share of central-office-level costs 
in total lending costa 
5. Share of direct costs in total 
lending costs 
6. Share of personnel costs in total 
lending costs 
7. Average lending costs, per loan 
8. Average lending costs, per 
lempira lent 
9. Incidence of loan evaluation 
and analysis in total lending 
costs, 
OVerall 
Branch-level 
10. Incidence of loan monitoring and 
supervision in total lending costs, 
OVerall 
Branch-level 
11. Incidence of loan recovery in 
total lending costs, 
Overall 
Branch-level 
12. Incidence of branch-level record-
keeping and documentation in total 
lending costs, 
Overall 
Branch-level 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
Lps)_/ 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
Commercial 
Bank 
32.5 
67.5 
77.1 
22.9 
74.2 
41.1 
1,748.4 
2.53 
45.0 
58.3 
4.3 
5.6 
13.5 
17.4 
8.2 
10.6 
Development 
Bank 
77.2 
22.8 
43.1 
56.9 
37.5 
26.8 
260.0 
8.36 
15.5 
36.0 
7.1 
16.5 
5.8 
13.3 
5.3 
12.2 
Source: lncome-expenditure statements and branch-level survey results. 
1/ 
- 2 Lempiras • 1 u.s. dollar. 
Notes: --Rows 1 and 2 add up to 100 perc~nt. 
--Rows 3 and 4 add up to 100 percent. 
--The complement of row 5 constitutes indirect costs. 
--Row 6 (personnel costs) is a component of direct costs. 
--Rows 9 through 12 do not necessarily add up to 100 percent since 
other miscellaneous costs at the branch level and overall are 
not included in the tables. 
share of deposit handling and other banking services. A majority of the PB's 
resources, 67.5% of total costs, are devoted to deposit mobilization and the 
provision of other services, while only 32.5% of its total costs can be asso-
elated with lending activities. The opposite is true for the DB, where 77.2% 
of its costs are credit-related whereas only 22.8% of total costs relate to 
deposits and other services. This acute contrast reflects the DB's greater 
reliance on external funds and special rediscount lines from the central bank, 
as compared to the PB which relies much more heavily upon financial resources 
mobilized from the general public. To illustrate this difference between the 
two banks, the shares of the main sources of funds in their loan portfolio are 
indicated below: 
Development Bank, Private Bank, 
(DB) ~1980) (PB) (1981) 
No. of Loan No. of Loan 
Source of Funds Loans Amounts Loans Amounts 
Own Resources % 5.9 34.7 90.0 91.0 
Central Bank Rediscount % 79.2 40.5 6.2 5.9 
External Funds* % 14.9 24.8 3.8 1.1 
* World Bank, AID, an IDB funcis i.n the DB case; World Bank funds in 
the case of the PB. 
These differences with respect to the banks' predominant sources of funds 
between the two banks underly many other contrasts observed in their cost 
structures, as will be discussed later. 
Lending costs are generated primarily at the branch level in the case of 
the PB (77.1%), with only 22.9% of total lending costs being attributable to 
costs generated at the central-office level. Again the opposite pattern is 
6 
observed in the DB case, where 57% of its lending costs correspond to central-
office resources entering the loan procedure, while 43% of lending costs are 
due to branch-level activities. Thus a higher degree of centralization is 
clearly observed in the DB case, whereas the PB cost structure reflects a dif-
ferent strategy of regionalization and decentralization of the decision-making 
process. 
We conclude that the heavy incidence of special lines of credit and 
externally-funded projects in the development hank places most of the hurden 
of documentation, disaggregated accounting and reporting to the funding agen-
cies at the central-office level. Therefore, a serious constraint is heing 
implicitly imposed on the decentralization efforts of the DB, to the extent 
that these recording, accounting and reporting requirements continue growing 
as new special credit projects enter the liability portfolio of the develop-
ment bank. 
Rows 5 and 6 of Table 1 show another revealing contrast between the two 
banks. Direct costs account for 74.2% of total lending costs in the PB, and 
among them, personnel costs represent 41.1% of total lending costs. The 
corresponding shares in the DB case are 37.5% and 26.8% respectively. These 
different shares denote important qualitative differences between the resour-
ces employed in the two institutions, and particularly in the area of human 
resources. It was expected that, given the characteristics of the DB's clien-
tele, more numerous and in general more risky customers than that of the PB, 
the DB would direct more resources into the loan operation. However, even 
thol.lih this assumption could still hold in "physical" terms, the value of the 
resources directly involved is far more important in the PB case, reflecting a 
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higher level of investment in more expensive and better trained human resour-
ces and other direct inputs for its credit operations. 
As for the level of lending costs per loan, these were estimated at a 
level considerably higher in the case of the PB as compared to the DB (see row 
7 in Table 1). It is necessary to point out that the sample included 86% of 
the loan amounts, but only 64% of the number of loans, therefore the average 
loan amount of the sample branches is larger than that relevant for the insti-
tution as a whole. The average cost per lempira lent in the PB amounts to 
2.53%, a rate that contrasts with the 8.36% obtained for the DB (row 8 in 
Table 1). Note that these estimates do not include provisions for bad debts, 
thus representing a lower bound estimate for the operational spread that these 
institutions would require in order not to suffer operational losses. 
The results obtained for the DB are particularly striking, especially 
when comparing these results with the margins contemplated in credit projects 
funded by external agencies or the central bank. These funding sources 
usually only allow 3 to 4 percentage points to cover the administrative costs 
allegedly associated with the on-lending of their funds. Thus, to operate 
with these special lines of credit, the DB~ priori experiences an operational 
loss of over 4%, assuming that all loans are fully repaid. There exists a 
policy inconsistency here in the sense that external donors and/or the govern-
ment impose on the DB costly loan targets. The costs of servicing a more 
risky, more numerous, and more costly clientele, for which the institution is 
reimbursed only at a margin of 3 or 4 percentage points, seriously compromise 
the financial viability of the institution. It is interesting to note that 
the usual 3-4% margin is closer to the average lending costs observed in 
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efficient private commercial banks like the one under study here, than to the 
average lending costs observed in the development bank. 
The functional breakdown of lending costs summarized in rows 9 through 12 
of Table 1 provide some additional insights into the main factors underlying 
the cost differences between the two banks. The most important difference is 
observed in the incidence of loan evaluation and analysis in total lending 
costs. These are three times as high in the PB as in the DB and twice as high 
in the PB at the branch level. The opposite was observed for the share of 
loan monitoring and supervisory costs. These costs were considerably higher 
in the case of the DB as compared to the PB. 
The foregoing observed differences in the functional structure of lending 
costs strongly suggest that in dealing with a more numerous and risky clien-
tele the DB is induced to concentrate its resources in monitoring and super-
visory activities rather than in the loan evaluation and analysis that precede 
loan approval. A factor that influences this behavior is the incidence of 
targeted funds in the overall volume of the DB's operations. These targeted 
funds typically entail widespread requirements with respect to the control, 
monitoring and supervision of the end-use of funds, along with explicit and 
implicit pressures to allocate credit into risky activities that are charac-
teristic of supply-leading financial schemes. 
Loan recovery costs stand out with a more important incidence in total 
lending CQSts in the case of the PB, as compared to the DB, even though there 
exist important qualitative differences between the two banks in terms of 
their recovery efforts. Most recovery actions undertaken by PB officials 
occur before the loans become three months overdue, whereas in the DB case 
loan recovery efforts were concentrated on loans long overdue, where the 
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probability of repayment could be considered slim (delinquency rates were 
approximately 5% for the PB, and 50% for the DB, in 1981). 
Finally, Table 2 summarizes the results of an effort to estimate the PB's 
lending costs taking into account differences due to source of funds, end-use 
of the loan, and loan size. The figures reported correspond to costs per 
lempira lent generated at the branch level, where the basis to discriminate 
between different types of loans was the different amount of time spent by 
credit officials in handling the loan applications. For the sub-sample uti-
lized in this exercise, central-office costs add 0.6 percentage points as an 
overhead cost to the branch-level costs reported in Table 2. Own resources in 
this table include "regular" rediscount lines of the central bank (as opposed 
to "special" lines) that are of rather low importance in the funding of the 
PB's loan portfolio, as has been illustrated before. 
Table 2. Private Bank's Lending Costs (per lempira lent), 
at the Branch Level, According to Source of Funds, 
End-Use of the Loan, and Loan Size. Percentages. 
Loan Size Source of Funds 
and End-Use Less than L.l25,000 More than L.l2S,OOO 
Own Resources 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Housing & Real Estate 
Commerce 
Consumption 
Other 
World Bank 
Agriculture 
3.13 
1.32 
7.23 
1.62 
5.64 
1.64 
7.82 
Source: Estimates based on survey results. 
0.28 
0.23 
0.41 
0.34 
0.33 
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The results of Table 2 indicate that the two main factors that affect 
lending costs are the loan size, and the source of funds. Differences in 
costs generated by the end-use of loans are less important. Loans of a size 
larger than 125,000 lempiras cost less than 1% to operate (including the 0.6% 
central-office costs). Among those loans of less than 125,000 lempiras, 
funded with the bank's own resources, housing and real estat~ appears as the 
end-use with the highest administrative costs per lempira lent. ~~riculture 
is third in order of importance, with industrial sector loans showing the 
lowest cost of loan servicing. 
However, of particular importance is the fact that loans funded by the 
World Bank project are extremely costly to adminiRter. This is due to the 
considerably greater amount of documentation, farm and project planning, 
record-keeping, supervision and reporting requirements that these loans entail 
for the on-lending institution. Note that if the 0.6 percentage points esti-
mated as central-office overhead costs are added to the ).13% branch-level 
costs of granting loans to agriculture with the bank's own r~sources, we 
arrive at a figure fairly close to the "traditional" 4% margin considered in 
externally-funded and government-funded special credit projects. However, the 
true adminiRtrative costs induced by these special programs will be closer to 
the 7.8% estimated for World Bank funds in the PB case (8.4% adding the 
central-office overhead costs) or the 8.36% estimated as an average for the DB 
where, as shown before, 94% of the loans were financed by central bank 
redi~aount lines and external funds. Our results here suggest that the usual 
4% spread allowed in these projects would only be appropriat~ if no additional 
information, monitoring, record-keeping, accounting, and reporting require-
ments accompanied these special lines of credit. 
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4. Conclusions 
This study has emphasized the sharp contrasts in the structure of lending 
costs and overall organization between a public sector and a private sector 
bank servicing agriculture in a less developed country. It is clear that the 
source of funds to these institutions plays a crucial role in determining the 
composition of their loan portfolio and the lending costs incurred by the 
banks. The private bank, relying more on locally mobilized deposit~, is more 
cautious and efficient in evaluating and screening loans at the branch level 
and, in general, delegates more decision-making to the branch level in 
managing their portfolio. The public sector bank is far more centr.tlized and 
registers a heavy overlay of administrative costs associated with loan 
targeting criteria imposed by external sources of finance. Importa11t here is 
the fact that external donor agencies impose far higher lendin~ costs on the 
on-lending institutions than they probably realize. They impose unrealisti-
cally low administrative margins to service these costs which contributes to 
the financial unviability of these institutions. In the end "cheap" credit 
programs are not cheap to the institutions required to on-lend these resources 
with serious consequences for their future as viable financial institutions or 
programs. International donors and local governments should either reconsider 
their low administrative cost margins policy or alter the costly features of 
their loan targeting criteria. Otherwise they should accept the negative 
consequences of subsidizing permanently the financial institutions receiving 
the funds. 
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